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The Artificially Intelligent Trolley Problem:
Understanding Our Criminal Law Gaps in a
Robot Driven World
JAKE FEILER*

Abstract
Not only is Artificial Intelligence (AI) present everywhere in people’s
lives, but the technology is also now capable of making unpredictable decisions in novel situations. AI poses issues for the United States’ traditional
criminal law system because this system emphasizes mens rea’s importance
in determining criminal liability. When AI makes unpredictable decisions
that lead to crimes, it will be impractical to determine what mens rea to ascribe to the human agents associated with the technology, such as AI’s creators, owners, and users. To solve this issue, the United States’ legal system
must hold AI’s creators, owners, and users strictly liable for their AI’s actions and also create standards that can provide these agents immunity from
strict liability. Although other legal scholars have proposed solutions that fit
within the United States’ traditional criminal law system, these proposals
fail to strike the right balance between encouraging AI’s development and
holding someone criminally liable when AI causes harm.
This Note illuminates this issue by exploring an artificially intelligent
trolley problem. In this problem, an AI-powered self-driving car must decide
between running over and killing five pedestrians or swerving out of the way
and killing its one passenger; ultimately, the AI decides to kill the five pedestrians. This Note explains why the United States’ traditional criminal law
system would struggle to hold the self-driving car’s owner, programmers,
and creator liable for the AI’s decision, because of the numerous human
* Judicial Law Clerk, United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas; J.D., Loyola
Law School, Los Angeles, 2022; B.A., Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, University of Michigan, 2017. Thank you to Professor Laurie Levenson for her support the last three years. This would
not have been possible without her guidance. I would also like to thank the staff and editors of the
Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal for their hard work and diligent edits.
[1]
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agents this problem brings into the criminal liability equation, the impracticality of determining these agents’ mens rea, and the difficulty in satisfying
the purposes of criminal punishment. Looking past the artificially intelligent
trolley problem, these issues can be extended to most criminal laws that require a mens rea element. Criminal law serves as a powerful method of regulating new technologies, and it is essential that the United States’ criminal
law system adapts to solve the issues that AI poses.
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I. Introduction
Once only a science-fiction dream, artificial intelligence (AI) is now
present everywhere in people’s everyday lives.1 Generally, AI refers to a machine’s ability to perform tasks that require human intelligence.2 What makes
AI so powerful, however, is its ability to learn: AI is able “to adapt according
to the feedback received in order to solve problems and address situations
that go beyond the predefined set of … instructions that the AI was programmed with.”3 This means that AI “can ‘decide’ how to respond to unprecedented scenarios and also ‘choose’ how to navigate a novel situation
towards successfully achieving some objective.”4 AI uses machine learning
to take in new information, learn from it, and make decisions in novel situations.5
AI is unique in that there is not “a single product” nor is it its own industry.6 Rather, AI “is an enabler of many industries and facets of human
life: scientific research, education, manufacturing, logistics, transportation,
defense, law enforcement, politics, advertising, art, culture, and more.”7
From search algorithms and recommendation engines8 to autonomous weapons,9 there is no escaping AI. As a result, “[i]n 2020, American AI start-ups
raised almost $38 billion in funding. Their Asian counterparts raised $25

1. HENRY A. KISSINGER ET AL., THE AGE OF AI: AND OUR HUMAN FUTURE 14 (2021).
2. Id.
3. Dafni Lima, Could AI Agents Be Held Criminally Liable? Artificial Intelligence and the
Challenges for Criminal Law, 69 S.C. L. REV. 677, 682 (2018).
4. Id.
5. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
8. Cameron F. Kerry, Protecting Privacy in an AI-Driven World, BROOKINGS (Feb. 10,
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/protecting-privacy-in-an-ai-driven-world/.
9. Nathan Reitinger, Algorithmic Choice and Superior Responsibility: Closing the Gap Between Liability and Lethal Autonomy by Defining the Line Between Actors and Tools, 51 GONZ. L.
REV. 79, 87 (2015–2016). The decision to shift “away from human control and toward technological autonomy . . . is particularly acute when it comes to military activity.” Id. at 82. That is because
militaries can use autonomous weapons to “conduct functions that humans carry out only with
difficulty.” KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 156. Autonomous weapons are not necessarily new,
as drones and unmanned ground vehicles have been around for years. Reitinger, supra. Specifically,
lethal autonomous weapons are “automatic or semiautomatic AI weapons that are trained and authorized to select their own targets and attack without further human authorization.” KISSINGER ET
AL., supra note 1, at 139. For example, “the Navy’s Phalanx system . . . autonomically defends
Navy vessels from incoming missiles without the need for human authorization or intervention.”
Reitinger, supra, at 92-93. Although these autonomous weapons are not without their opposition,
Gordon Johnson of the Joint Forces Command at the Pentagon explained his support for these
weapons by stating, “[t]hey don’t get hungry. They’re not afraid. They don’t forget their orders.
They don’t care if the guy next to them has just been shot. Will they do a better job than humans?
Yes.” Id. at 88.
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billion. And their European counterparts raised $8 billion.” Moreover, “political and corporate leaders routinely announce their goals to ‘win’ in AI or,
at the very least, to adopt AI and tailor it to meet their objectives.”11
As AI’s prevalence in society grows, the magnitude of its long-term
impact on people has become clearer. Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, and
Daniel Huttenlocher112 explain how AI’s growth will alter “human identity
and the human experience of reality at levels not experienced since the dawn
of the modern age . . . the technology is changing human thought,
knowledge, perception, and reality — and, in so doing, changing the course
of human history.”13 Kissinger, Schmidt, and Huttenlocher worry that “[n]o
expert, no matter his or her field, can single-handedly comprehend a future
in which machines learn and employ logic beyond the present scope of human reason.”14 Elon Musk even believes that AI poses an existential threat
to humans, stating that humans could “become the equivalent of ‘house cats’
to new AI overlords.”15
Given AI’s potential impact on society, it will be important to have a
criminal law framework in place to govern the technology as it grows. That
is because “[c]riminal law embodies the most powerful legal social control
in modern civilization.”16 As further discussed below,17 “[t]he basic question
of criminal law is the question of criminal liability; i.e., whether the specific
entity . . . bears criminal liability for a specific offense committed at a specific point in time and space.”18 To find something criminally liable, two
elements must be proven: first, there must be an actus reus, which is the
criminal conduct; second, there must be a mens rea, which is a particular

10. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
11. Id.
12. Henry Kissinger served as Secretary of State from 1973–1977 and won the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1973. HENRY A. KISSINGER, https://www.henryakissinger.com/ (last visited May 5, 2022).
Eric Schmidt was Google’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman from 2001–2011 and was formerly the Chairman of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. About Eric,
ERIC SCHMIDT, https://ericschmidt.com/bio/ (last visited May 5, 2022). Daniel Huttenlocher is the
dean of the MIT Schwarzman College of Computing, and his research includes understanding AI.
DAN HUTTENLOCHER, https://web.mit.edu/hutt/www/ (last visited May 5, 2022).
13. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 4–5.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Ben Gilbert, Elon Musk Says He’s Terrified of AI Taking Over the World and Most Scared
of Google’s DeepMind AI Project, INSIDER (July 27, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/elonmusk-maureen-dowd-ai-google-deepmind-wargames-20207#:~:text=Tesla%20and%20SpaceX%20CEO%20Elon,with%20The%20New%20York%20Time
s. Musk is particularly afraid of Google’s work on AI, discussed infra Section II(B). Id.
16. Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities—From Science
Fiction to Legal Social Control, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 171, 173 (2010).
17. See discussion infra Section III(B)(2).
18. Hallevy, supra note 16, at 177.
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internal mental state. If either of these elements are missing, usually “no
criminal liability can be imposed.”20
Unfortunately, AI “will undoubtedly pose great challenges for criminal
law.”21 As Dafni Lima explains, crimes involving AI will bring numerous
human actors into the criminal liability equation:
[A]n AI agent will be . . . dependent upon its design and programming,
which necessarily includes human agents such as its designers, programmers, and developers as relevant actors. AI agents will also sometimes—or rather, almost always, in the current stage of technological
development—interact with an operator, as well as other human actors
that they necessarily engage with . . . All these individuals are
‘brought’ into the scene of the crime for questioning, forcing criminal
law to make difficult yet interesting decisions when ascribing liability.22

Moreover, as AI can make its own decisions in novel situations, these
human actors that AI brings into the criminal liability equation will be unable
to foresee every possible action that the AI can make.23 Instead, “all these
actors [will be able to] say for certain is that the Intelligent Agent will devise
its own solutions.”24
It is clear that AI is capable of making decisions outside of its human
creators’ instructions,25 and it is becoming increasingly likely that AI can
“access[] reality differently from the way humans access it.”26 Moreover,
AI’s involvement in crimes is likely to bring in more human actors than normal.27 These features of AI, combined with the importance that mens rea
holds in American criminal laws,28 pose a real issue: using the current mens
rea framework, how can the United States’ criminal justice system impose
criminal liability on these numerous human actors for an AI’s responsibility
in a crime, when the AI made decisions outside of the human actors’ instructions and in ways that the humans could not possibly foresee? As such, there
appears to be a gap in our current criminal laws when AI is involved in a
crime—specifically, how can our criminal laws reconcile what specific mens
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Lima, supra note 3, at 694.
22. Id. at 681.
23. Sabine Gless et al., If Robots Cause Harm, Who is to Blame? Self-Driving Cars and Criminal Liability, NEW CRIM. L. REV. 412, 414 (2016).
24. Id.
25. Lima, supra note 3.
26. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
27. Lima, supra note 3, at 681.
28. Hallevy, supra note 16, at 177; Lima, supra note 3, at 686–87.
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rea each of these numerous human actors have, when these actors could not
foresee the AI’s actions, and what persons should our legal system hold liable.
Section II provides background on AI’s history and future development,
particularly emphasizing recent developments in Google’s AlphaZero AI
chess program and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) use
of AI to discover the new antibiotic halicin. This Section then discusses AI’s
pros and cons and why the world cannot reverse course on the technology.
Section III next examines why traditional American criminal law does not
fit well with AI. This Section accomplishes this by assessing whether an AIpowered self-driving car’s owner, programmers, or creator229 could be held
liable when the car is faced with a modified version of the trolley problem
(artificially intelligent trolley problem)—specifically, the self-driving car
must decide between running over and killing five pedestrians or swerving
out of the way and killing its one passenger. For simplicity, this Note focuses
only on the case where the car runs over the five pedestrians and why this
situation causes issues involving the numerous human agents brought into
the criminal liability equation, how our legal system would determine each
agent’s mens rea and why this becomes impractical, and why it would be
difficult to satisfy the purposes of criminal punishment. This Section concludes by expanding the issues that the artificially intelligent trolley problem
raises to the broader criminal law system and generally laws that include a
mens rea element. Finally, Section IV suggests solutions to the issues that
Section I and Section III raise: using strict liability to hold AI’s creators,
owners, and users criminally liable for their AI’s actions; developing standards that can give creators, owners, and users immunity from strict liability;
and empowering a task force or agency to research AI and make recommendations on how the United States’ legal system should respond to AI developments.

II. Artificial Intelligence’s History, Future, and
Inevitability
In 1950, Alan Turing published his paper Computing Machinery and
Intelligence, where he began with the question: “Can machines think?”30 75
29. There has been ample discussion analyzing whether American criminal laws can consider
AI as a “person” for purposes of criminal punishment. This Note will not analyze that issue, as I do
not believe that society is ready to accept punishing AI, as if it is a person, as a satisfying punishment to vindicate crimes. For discussion on treating AI as a “person” for criminal punishment, see
Hallevy, supra note 16, at 186–193; Lima, supra note 3, at 693–96; Ying Hu, Robot Criminals, 52
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 487, 488–493 (2019).
30. Chris Smith et al., The History of Artificial Intelligence, UNIV. OF WASH. 5 (Dec. 2006),
https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06au/projects/history-ai.pdf (internal quotation
omitted).
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years after Turing posited this question, it is clear that the world is full of AIpowered machines that, at the very least, replicate human thinking and intelligence.31 Today, it is almost impossible to escape AI-powered machines:
Apple’s “Siri” uses AI to connect all of a user’s information to better respond
to that person; Amazon uses AI to better predict and suggest products for
users; and Netflix uses AI to help understand users’ likes and dislikes.32 In a
relatively short period, what was once reserved for science-fiction and research papers has become reality.33
This Section first briefly discusses AI’s history. Next, this Section reviews two recent AI developments—Google’s AlphaZero AI chess program
and MIT’s use of AI to discover the new antibiotic halicin—and examines
what these advancements illustrate about AI and indicate about its future development. Finally, this Section concludes by examining AI’s pros and cons
and argues that the world cannot turn back on AI.
A. Artificial Intelligence’s History

As mentioned above, in 1950, Alan Turing pondered whether machines
could think and suggested that if humans could use reason when making decisions, machines should be able to do so as well.34 Turing proposed “a
method for evaluating whether machines can think, which came to be known
as the Turing Test.”35 Unfortunately, Turing was unable to act on his proposition because, at that time, computers lacked the necessary capabilities to
accomplish what Turing proposed and were also expensive.36
In 1955, five years after Turing’s paper, Allen Newell, Cliff Shaw, and
Herbert Simon were able to create a proof of concept that continued on Turing’s research.37 Their concept, called the Logic Theorist, was “designed to
mimic the problem solving skills of a human” and is “considered by many
to be the first artificial intelligence program.”38 In 1956, Newell, Shaw, and
Simon presented the Logic Theorist at the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, which John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky
hosted.39 At this event, McCarthy adopted the term “Artificial Intelligence”
31. Craig S. Smith, A.I. Here, There, Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/technology/ai-innovation-privacy-seniors-education.html.
32. 10 Things That Use Artificial Intelligence and You’ve Probably Never Realized It, ADEXT
AI, https://blog.adext.com/things-apps-artificial-intelligence/ (last visited May 5, 2022).
33. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1; Smith, supra note 31.
34. Rockwell Anyoha, The History of Artificial Intelligence, SITNBOSTON (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/.
35. Smith et al., supra note 30.
36. Anyoha, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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for the first time and hoped to bring together top scientists for a discussion
on AI.41 Although the conference did not succeed in the way McCarthy
hoped, “everyone whole-heartedly aligned with the sentiment that AI was
achievable.”42
From 1957–1974, scientists made great progress on AI research.43 This
is because “[c]omputers could store more information and became faster,
cheaper, and more accessible. Machine learning algorithms also improved
and people got better at knowing which algorithm to apply to their problem.”44 During this time, “researchers emphasized developing algorithms
which [could] solve mathematical problems.”45 Unfortunately, after this
great progress, the years between 1974 and 1980 brough the first AI winter.46
Due to the “lack of computational power to do anything substantial” and reduced funding for projects, research and interest in AI decreased.47 As one
person stated, “computers were still millions of times too weak to exhibit
intelligence.”48
The first AI winter ended in 1980 because researchers expanded the
techniques they used to create AI and an influx of new funding appeared.49
During the next few years, scientists created two important techniques: deep
learning and expert systems.50 Deep learning “allow[s] computers to learn
using experience.”51 Expert systems, on the other hand, “mimic[] the decision making process of a human expert. The program would ask an expert in
a field how to respond in a given situation, and once this was learned for
virtually every situation, non-experts could receive advice from that program.”52 Unfortunately, similar to what happened after the AI boom that took

40. History of Artificial Intelligence, JAVA POINT, https://www.javatpoint.com/history-of-artificial-intelligence (last visited May 5, 2022).
41. Anyoha, supra note 34.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. History of Artificial Intelligence, supra note 40. For example, Newell and Simon, who
created the Logic Theorist with Shaw, developed the General Problem Solver that, as its name
suggests, helped solve problems. Anyoha, supra note 34. Joseph Weizenbaum also developed
Eliza, which interpreted spoken language. Id.
46. History of Artificial Intelligence, supra note 40.
47. Id.; Anyoha, supra note 34.
48. Anyoha, supra note 34 (internal quotation omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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place from 1957–1974, after seven years of great AI progress, the second AI
winter occurred from 1987–1993.53
Following the second AI winter, from 1993–2011, researchers accomplished many of the AI community’s goals.54 For example, in 1997, IBM’s
AI-powered chess program, Deep Blue, defeated the reigning world chess
champion Gary Kasparov.55 In 2002, the home vacuum cleaner Roomba,
powered by AI, made its way into people’s houses and was able to “check
every area of a field and ensure coverage.”56 In 2010, Apple introduced Siri,
“the first intelligent personal assistant to replace keyboards and touch
screens.”57
Finally, beginning in 2011 and continuing to this day, AI development
moved into the big data age.58 Big data refers to “high-volume, high-velocity
and/or high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing that enable enhanced insight, decision
making, and process automation.”59 The combination of “big data and massive computing simply allow artificial intelligence to learn through brute
force.”60 Some major developments that have occurred in AI’s big data age
include: in 2011, IBM’s AI-powered Watson won Jeopardy by defeating two
former champions; in 2014, Tesla released its first version of an AI-powered
AutoPilot, giving drivers lane control and autonomous parking through “autonomous steering, braking, and speed limit adjustment based on signals image recognition;” and in 2019, Google started work on creating “an AI system that detects lung cancer more accurately than human radiologists.”61
As such, over a short period of less than 75 years, scientists have gone
from simply wondering whether machines can even think, to developing AIrun machines that detect lung cancer more accurately than trained doctors.
Although throughout this time there were AI winters where interest and
funding in AI was lacking, the world’s continual desire to further AI has led
to some of the most important developments during this time frame.

53. See History of Artificial Intelligence, supra note 40.
54. Anyoha, supra note 34; see also History of Artificial Intelligence, supra note 40 (addressing the emergence of intelligent agents from 1993-2011).
55. Anyoha, supra note 34.
56. Emilia Bratu, The Biggest AI Breakthroughs Over the Past 10 Years, QUALITANCE (Oct.
16, 2018), https://qualitance.com/blog/biggest-ai-breakthroughs-past-10-years/.
57. Id.
58. See Anyoha, supra note 34.
59. Gartner Glossary: Big Data, GARTNER, https://www.gartner.com/en/information-technology/glossary/big-data (last visited May 5, 2022).
60. Anyoha, supra note 34.
61. Maithreyan Surya, The Decade of Artificial Intelligence, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Dec. 31,
2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/the-decade-of-artificial-intelligence-6fcaf2fae473.
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B. AlphaZero, Halicin, and Future Development

Today, researchers are beginning to question whether AI has reached a
point where the technology can approach problems in ways humans do not
understand.62 Two recent AI developments highlight this: Google’s AlphaZero and MIT’s use of AI to develop the halicin antibiotic.
Google’s AlphaZero AI program is the byproduct of AlphaGo, the company’s prior AI program.63 AlphaGo became famous for defeating Lee
Sedol, then “the world’s best Go player, in March of 2016.”64 Although AlphaGo was a major achievement, Google’s researchers were not satisfied.65
To them, AlphaGo relied too much on humans to win: “The A.I. learned
which moves it should make, in part, by trying to mimic world-class players.
It also used a set of hand-coded heuristics to avoid the worst blunders when
looking ahead in games. To the researchers building AlphaGo, this
knowledge felt like a crutch.”66 Thus, Google created AlphaGo Zero and then
AlphaZero, an AI program that “had zero knowledge of Go beyond the rules
. . . [and could] be generalized to any two-person, zero-sum game of perfect
information.”67 Google claimed that this AI was “so powerful that you could
give it the rules of humanity’s richest and most studied games and, later that
day, it would become the best player there has ever been.”68
Google was not wrong. In late 2017 and again in 2018, AlphaZero decisively defeated Stockfish, “then the most powerful chess program in the
world.”69 AlphaZero accomplished this by learning through playing itself:
“Over the course of nine hours, the chess version of the program played
forty-four million games against itself on a massive cluster of specialized
Google hardware. After two hours, it began performing better than human
players; after four, it was beating the best chess engine in the world.”70
What makes AlphaZero’s wins startling is the way that the AI-machine
plays chess. The program “sacrificed pieces human players considered vital[,] . . . executed moves humans had not instructed it to consider, and, in
many cases, humans had not considered at all.”71 In a sense, AlphaZero’s

62. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 16, 18.
63. See James Somers, How the Artificial-Intelligence Program AlphaZero Mastered Its
Games, NEW YORKER (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/how-the-artificial-intelligence-program-alphazero-mastered-its-games.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
70. Somers, supra note 63.
71. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.
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strategy was not human; rather, “it had a logic of its own” and was able to
analyze the game in a way that “human minds cannot fully digest or employ.”72
In 2020, shortly after AlphaZero’s wins against Stockfish, MIT announced that it had used AI to discover a new antibiotic called halicin.73 Although scientists had used AI in the past to facilitate their antibiotic research,
halicin is “the first time [AI] has identified completely new kinds of antibiotic from scratch, without using any previous human assumptions.”74 Using
machine-learning, the AI “identified powerful new types of antibiotic from
a pool of more than 100 million molecules — including one that works
against a wide range of bacteria, including tuberculosis and strains considered untreatable.”75
Similar to AlphaZero, what makes MIT’s use of AI to discover halicin
unique is the process through which the AI discovered the antibiotic. MIT’s
“AI identified relationships that had escaped human detection — or possibly
even defied human description.”76 Regina Barzilay, who helped with the project, explained that AI “can learn new patterns unknown to human experts.”77
Looking back on the new antibiotic, MIT’s researchers cannot “articulate
precisely” why the process even worked.78 In a sense, then, the AI “detected
aspects of reality humans have not detected, or perhaps cannot detect.”79
AlphaZero and halicin both demonstrate how far AI has come and also
how big its impact on the future could be. Kissinger, Schmidt, and Huttenlocher explain how AlphaZero and halicin “are mere first steps . . . in unveiling previously imperceptible but potentially vital aspects of reality.”80 It
is unclear whether researchers will ever “produce artificial general intelligence (AGI) — that is, software capable of human-level performance of any
intellectual task and capable of relating tasks and concepts to others across
disciplines.”81 Still, these AI advancements force researchers to “confront
72. Id.
73. Jo Marchant, Powerful Antibiotics Discovered Using AI, NATURE (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00018-3.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 11.
77. Marchant, supra note 73.
78. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 11.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id. at 19. In a sense, “AGI is a catchall for the hopes and fears surrounding an entire
technology. Contrary to popular belief, it’s not really about machine consciousness or thinking
robots.” Will Douglas Heaven, Artificial General Intelligence: Are We Close, and Does It Even
Make Sense to Try?, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/15/1010461/artificial-general-intelligence-robots-ai-agi-deepmind-
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whether there is a form of logic that humans have not achieved or cannot
achieve, exploring aspects of reality we have never known and may never
directly know.”82
C. Artificial Intelligence’s Inevitability

AI is a controversial subject, and the technology has both benefits and
drawbacks.83 On the one hand, “AI can make everyday life more convenient
and enjoyable, improving [people’s] health and standard of living.”84
Streaming apps use AI to suggest shows tailored to users’ previous interests;
doctors use AI to search patients’ health data and alert them to any irregularities; and navigation apps use AI to direct drivers around accidents.85 Moreover, “AI can offer accessibility for people with disabilities.”86 Virtual assistants, such as Siri and Alexa, use AI to help coordinate users’ lives and
perform various tasks; certain apps use AI to transcribe conversations or read
information to users out loud; and particular AI projects allow people in
wheelchairs to move their wheelchairs through facial expressions.87 Furthermore, AI-powered technology is available twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week.88 This could be particularly helpful for services like helpline
centers.89
On the other hand, AI-powered machines might replace human workers, thereby increasing unemployment.90 As AI becomes less expensive to
google-openai/. AGI has become a popular topic again, and “[s]ome of the biggest, most respected
AI labs in the world take this goal very seriously.” Id. Opinions, however, vary on how soon researchers will be able to create AGI or whether AGI even matters. Although Elon Musk believes
that researchers will create AGI in the near future, Jerome Pesenti, head of AI at Facebook, said
that “Elon Musk has no idea what he is talking about . . . [t]here is no such thing as AGI and we
are nowhere near matching human intelligence.” Id. Andrew Ng, former head of AI at Baidu and a
cofounder of Google Brain, stated “[l]et’s cut out the AGI nonsense and spend more time on the
urgent problems.” Id. Julian Togelius, an AI researcher at New York University, stated that “[b]elief
in AGI is like belief in magic.” Id. Conversely, “OpenAI has said that it wants to be the first to
build a machine with human-like reasoning abilities” and Google’s DeepMind has stated that it
wants to “solve intelligence.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
82. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
83. See Elon Musk and Jack Ma Disagree About AI’s Threat, BBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49508091.
84. ProCon.org, Artificial Intelligence (AI) — Top 3 Pros and Cons, BRITANNICA:
PROCON.ORG (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.procon.org/headlines/artificial-intelligence-ai-top-3pros-and-cons/.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Sunil Kumar, Advantages and Disadvantages of Artificial Intelligence, TOWARDS DATA
SCI. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/advantages-and-disadvantages-of-artificialintelligence-182a5ef6588c.
89. Id.
90. ProCon.org, supra note 84.
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develop, companies might replace humans with AI—machines that do not
need sick days, bathroom breaks, or health insurance.91 Many businesses
have already begun to incorporate AI-powered self-checkout kiosks.92 AI
can also “exacerbate[] human racism.”93 This is due to “dataset bias” that
results from programmers including “insufficient data . . . for underrepresented groups such as racial minorities.”94 This occurs in areas such as facial
recognition and software that courts use to predict recidivism for sentencing
purposes.95 AI can also lead to privacy risks,96 as it “magnifies the ability to
use personal information in ways that can intrude on privacy interests by
raising analysis of personal information to new levels of power and speed.”97
Although AI has some drawbacks, there is no turning back on the technology. AI is becoming “commonplace on a global level”98 and “will become
more prevalent and more potent.”99 As researchers improve AI to the point
where its “performance outstrips that of humans for a given task, failing to
apply that AI . . . may appear increasingly as perverse or even negligent.”100
Today, many services people use on a daily basis—such as social media platforms, google searches, and streaming services—rely on AI to operate at
their current level.101 Moreover, as the cost to develop AI decreases, the technology will become even more commonplace in people’s lives.102
Ultimately, from Turing’s curiosity with whether machines can think to
developing AI systems that can detect lung cancer better than human radiologists, AI has rapidly grown in a short timeframe. Although there were periods where people lost interest in the technology, it is clear that today, researchers remain interested in AI and continue to push the boundaries of
what AI-powered machines can do. AlphaZero and halicin provide examples
of just how far this technology has come, demonstrating that AI not only can
make decisions in novel situations but also seems to make decisions in ways
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 79.
95. ProCon.org, supra note 84.
96. Id.
97. Cameron F. Kerry, Protecting Privacy in an AI-Driven World, BROOKINGS (Feb. 10,
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/protecting-privacy-in-an-ai-driven-world/.
98. Alejandro Ramírez Peña, Artificial Intelligence, an Inevitable Trend Which Is a Challenge
to Humanity, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO (Sept. 2019), https://www.urosario.edu.co/Research/advances-in-science-Ed-03-2019/Science-and-tech/Artificial-intelligence-an-inevitable-trendwhich/.
99. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 89.
100. Id. at 23.
101. Id. at 93–94.
102. Id. at 89.
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that humans cannot understand—in a sense, accessing reality in ways humans might never comprehend. Although it is unclear whether AI’s benefits
outweigh its costs, it seems there is no turning back on the technology. Today, it is both commonplace in people’s daily lives and on a global level. As
discussed in Section III below, AI’s inevitability and potential to make unpredictable decisions pose problems for the United States’ traditional criminal law system.

III. AI and Criminal Law
Given AI’s sometimes novel decision making,103 its potential to act in
ways completely unpredictable to humans,104 and its inevitable growth,105 it
will be essential to have a criminal law framework in place to regulate the
technology.106 It is unclear, however, whether the United States’ traditional
criminal law framework can adequately manage AI.
This Section explores this question by first examining why AI-powered
self-driving cars are becoming an increasingly relevant issue and how they
are interacting with criminal laws. Next, this Section analyzes how the
United States’ traditional criminal law framework would punish certain actors when an AI-powered self-driving car is faced with an artificially intelligent trolley problem—specifically, the self-driving car must decide between
running over and killing five pedestrians or swerving out of the way and
killing its one passenger—and how this problem illuminates why AI does
not fit with the United States’ traditional criminal law framework. Finally,
this Section concludes by expanding this issue from AI-powered self-driving
cars to how AI would interact with other criminal laws that require a mens
rea element and why the problems remain the same.
A. Self-Driving Cars

Self-driving cars are an understandably exciting possibility.107 A fully
autonomous, self-driving car is one “where the steering, the braking and the
other basic driving operations are performed by robotics, which is a combination of software, computers and hardware. And it’s guided by sensors instead of human vision to detect what’s around it and navigate through
103. Lima, supra note 3.
104. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 16–17.
105. Id. at 15.
106. This is because, as discussed infra Section III(B), AI’s application in something like selfdriving cars “will undoubtedly have implications that will affect how criminal law is construed and
how it is applied. More than that, it will provide an invaluable opportunity to revisit and reflect on
traditional criminal concepts.” Lima, supra note 3, at 678.
107. Jenny Cusack, How Driverless Cars Will Change Our World, BBC (Nov. 29, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20211126-how-driverless-cars-will-change-our-world.

16

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14:1

108

space.” Inside this machine, AI will be the “brains” that powers the car.109
Ultimately, “most companies building autonomous vehicles envision a future in which the automobile itself handles all the driving.”110 Although the
goal of a completely autonomous vehicle may be years away,111 key automotive and tech companies, such as Tesla, Google, Apple, GM, and Ford,
are currently developing the technology.112
People’s excitement about self-driving cars stems from the technology’s potential to make driving safer and transform the driving experience.113
Regarding driving safety, in 2021, the World Health Organization announced that around 1.3 million people die each year from road traffic
crashes.114 Unfortunately, human error causes 90% of those deaths.115 Camilla Fowler, head of automated transport for the United Kingdom’s
Transport Research Laboratory, explained that “[w]e want safer roads and
less fatalities. Automation ultimately could provide that.”116 In theory, selfdriving cars “will not be susceptible to all the human feelings that human
drivers have, like distraction, fatigue, [and] impatience.”117 In terms of the
driving experience, the possibility of self-driving cars “offers new opportunities to facilitate the mobility of . . . persons such as the disabled, the elderly,
and those too young to drive.”118 Moreover, these autonomous cars could
change the driving experience by, for example, allowing people to use cars
as “fully functioning mobile offices” or utilizing “machine learning

108. All Things Considered, What Does the Future of Driverless Cars Look Like?, NPR:
WBEZ CHI. (Oct. 23, 2021, 5:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/10/23/1048723026/what-doesthe-future-of-driverless-cars-look-like.
109. Bernard Marr, The 7 Biggest Artificial Intelligence (AI) Trends in 2022, FORBES (Sept.
24, 2021, 12:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2021/09/24/the-7-biggest-artificial-intelligence-ai-trends-in-2022/?sh=253e4e602015.
110. Forbes Tech. Council, 14 Tech Experts Predict Exciting Future Features of Driverless
Cars, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2021, 1:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/08/31/14-tech-experts-predict-exciting-future-features-of-driverlesscars/?sh=2d621221719e.
111. Cusack, supra note 107.
112. Marr, supra note 109. Even the University of Michigan developed the Mcity Test Facility,
“[t]he world’s first purpose-built testing ground for autonomous vehicles . . . made up of 16 acres
of road and traffic infrastructure.” Cusack, supra note 107.
113. Cusack, supra note 107.
114. Road Traffic Injuries, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 21, 2021), https://www.who.int/newsroom/fact-sheets/detail/road-traffic-injuries.
115. Marr, supra note 109.
116. Cusack, supra note 107.
117. All Things Considered, supra note 108.
118. Gless et al., supra note 23, at 413.
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capabilities to learn the routines and preferences of their passengers, thereby
providing greater assistance by automatically performing routine tasks.”119
Self-driving cars, however, also pose risks on society. Although selfdriving cars may theoretically reduce human error on the road, these cars
“are also susceptible to deficiencies that robotic drivers have that humans
don’t, discriminating between, say, a pedestrian waiting at the curb to cross
the street and a pedestrian who’s just . . . looking in a store window.”120
These types of issues with self-driving cars have caused accidents on the
road and setbacks in developing the vehicles. In January 2022, California
prosecutors filed the first felony charges in the United States for a fatal crash
involving a partially automated driving system—Tesla’s “Autopilot” system.121 In February 2022, Tesla recalled “53,822 vehicles with its ‘full selfdriving’ driver-assisted feature after it was intentionally programmed to
slowly roll through stop signs in some scenarios.”122 In 2019, the National
Transportation Safety Board reported that “Uber’s autonomous vehicles, aka
driverless cars, were not designed to detect pedestrians who cross the street
outside of crosswalks.”123
B. The Artificially Intelligent Trolley Problem

One important issue with self-driving cars centers on control of the vehicles.124 Currently, our “legal system assumes that the person in the driver’s
seat is in control of the vehicle, which is not necessarily the case with autonomous vehicles.”125 As explained above, AI is capable of making novel decisions, in new circumstances, that humans cannot understand.126 In fully

119. Forbes Tech. Council, supra note 110.
120. All Things Considered, supra note 108.
121. Tom Krisher & Stefanie Dazio, Felony Charges Are 1st in a Fatal Crash Involving Autopilot, AP NEWS (Jan. 18, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/tesla-autopilot-fatal-crash-charges91b4a0341e07244f3f03051b5c2462ae. On May 19, 2022, a Judge ruled that the case could proceed
to trial. Hillel Aron, Judge Orders Trial in Tesla Autopilot Manslaughter Case, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (May 19, 2022), https://www.courthousenews.com/judge-orders-trial-in-tesla-autopilot-manslaughter-case/.
122. Matt McFarland, Tesla Recalls All 53,822 Vehicles with Its ‘Full Self-Driving’ Feature,
CNN BUS. (Feb. 1, 2022, 2:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/01/cars/tesla-fsd-stop-sign/index.html.
123. Ryan Deto, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Can’t Detect Pedestrians Who Walk Outside of
Crosswalks, Says Report, PITT. CITY PAPER (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/ubers-self-driving-cars-cant-detect-pedestrians-who-walk-outside-of-crosswalks-says-report/Content?oid=16160888.
124. Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues Created by Autonomous
Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2012).
125. Id.
126. See supra Section II(B).
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autonomous vehicles, this AI will be the brains that powers the car, meaning human actors will be ceding control of their vehicles to a sometimes unpredictable decision-maker.
This feature of self-driving cars—humans ceding decision-making to
AI—presents issues for traditional American criminal law. Analyzing how
American criminal laws would punish certain actors in an artificially intelligent version of the “trolley problem” illuminates this issue.
1. The Trolley Problem and its Application to AI

The trolley problem is an old philosophical and psychological thought
experiment.128 The experiment’s traditional version is this:
[Y]ou are riding in a trolley without functioning brakes, headed toward
a switch in the tracks. On the current track stand five people who stand
to be killed if the trolley continues on its path. You have access to a
switch that would make the trolley change to the other track, but another individual stands there. That person is certain to be killed if the
switch is activated. So do you switch tracks or not?129

The trolley problem has many variations to it, but the problem’s core
remains the same—centering on “any choice that seemingly has a trade-off
between what is good and what sacrifices are ‘acceptable,’ if at all.”130 In
2014, the MIT Media Lab expanded this idea to self-driving cars in an experiment called “Moral Machine.”131 In their experiment, researchers
127. Marr, supra note 109.
128. Next Stop: ‘Trolley Problem’, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/trolley-problem-moral-philosophy-ethics (last visited May 6, 2022) [hereinafter Trolley Problem]. In the context of a person driving a car, traditionally the trolley problem
invites people to ponder whether a driver could claim a necessity defense when faced with this
choice. A necessity defense “may apply when an individual commits a criminal act during an emergency situation in order to prevent a greater harm from happening. In such circumstances, our legal
system typically excuses the individual’s criminal act because it was justified, or finds that no criminal act has occurred.” Necessity Defense in Criminal Cases, JUSTIA (Oct. 2021), https://www.justia.com/criminal/defenses/necessity. A driver faced with a trolley problem would be forced into
killing at least one person, and the driver might claim that the necessity defense excuses that action
because it occurred during an emergency situation. Although the necessity defense could also apply
when an AI-powered self-driving car is faced with a trolley problem, this Note will not discuss the
issue. Instead, this Note focuses on the initial criminal liability aspect that the artificially intelligent
trolley problem raises, infra Section III(B)(2)–(C), holding certain actors strictly liable for their
AI’s actions, infra Section IV(A), and how certain standards would provide a defense to strict liability, infra Section IV(B).
129. Trolley Problem, supra note 128.
130. Id.
131. Karen Hao, Should a Self-Driving Car Kill the Baby or the Grandma? Depends on Where
You’re
From,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Oct.
24,
2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/10/24/139313/a-global-ethics-study-aims-to-help-ai-solve-the-self-drivingtrolley-problem.
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crowdsourced what decisions people would have a self-driving car make in
modified versions of the trolley problem, such as “should a self-driving car
prioritize humans over pets, passengers over pedestrians, more lives over
fewer, women over men, young over old, fit over sickly, higher social status
over lower, law-abiders over law-benders . . . [, and] should the car swerve
(take action) or stay on course (inaction)?”132
Applying the trolley problem to AI is a controversial subject,133 and it
is easy to see why. In the context of driving, “[w]hen a human driver confronts a Trolley Problem, they presumably take into account their own potential death or injury.”134 Conversely, it is reasonable to assume that an AIpowered self-driving car will not be “concerned about its own well-being.”135
Self-driving cars, however, will likely have passengers in them.136 This is
where the trolley problem’s application to self-driving cars—and broadly to
AI—becomes problematic: the AI that is powering the self-driving car,
which is not concerned with its own well-being, must make decisions that
could seriously injure or kill pedestrians, passengers, and other drivers.137
2. The Artificially Intelligent Trolley Problem and Criminal Law

Under this context, applying the trolley problem to self-driving cars is
not only controversial, but problematic for the United States’ traditional
criminal law system. As stated above, “[t]he basic question of criminal law
is the question of criminal liability; i.e., whether the specific entity . . . bears
criminal liability for a specific offense committed at a specific point in time
and space.”138 There are four common purposes of criminal punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.139 Retribution’s purpose is to prevent “future crime by removing the desire for personal avengement . . . against the defendant. When victims or society discover that the
defendant has been adequately punished for a crime, they achieve a certain

132. Id.
133. Lance Eliot, AI Ethicists Clash Over Real-World Aptness of the Controversial Trolley
Problem, but for Self-Driving Cars It Is the Real Deal, FORBES (July 27, 2020, 11:53 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lanceeliot/2020/07/27/ai-ethicists-clash-over-real-world-aptness-ofthe-controversial-trolley-problem-but-for-self-driving-cars-it-is-the-real-deal/?sh=a4de9185095a.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Hallevy, supra note 16, at 177.
139. Nora V. Demleitner, Types of Punishment, THE OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (Markus
D. Dubber ed., Tatjana Hörnle ed.), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199673599.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199673599-e-41.
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satisfaction that our criminal procedure is working effectively.” Deterrence’s purpose is to prevent “future crime by frightening the defendant or
the public.”141 There are two types of deterrence: specific deterrence “applies
to an individual defendant” and general deterrence “applies to the public at
large.”142 Rehabilitation’s purpose is to prevent “future crime by reforming
a defendant’s behavior.”143 Finally, incapacitation’s purpose is to prevent
“future crime by removing the defendant from society.”144
There are two required elements to find something criminally liable.145
First, there must be an actus reus, which is an “external element” that manifests “mainly by acts or omissions.”146 Second, there must be a mens rea,
which is a particular “internal or mental element.”147 These internal elements
or mental states include: the higher standard of purposely or intentionally
committing a crime, meaning the person’s goal was the crime; knowingly
acting, meaning the person was virtually certain that the crime would occur;
recklessly acting, meaning the person consciously disregarded the risk; and
the lower standard of negligently acting, meaning the person should have
been aware.148 Occasionally, criminal laws will hold entities strictly liable
for crimes, meaning that there is no required mental state.149 Strict liability,
however, “stands in stark tension with many of [criminal law’s] underlying
principles.”150 That is because mens rea was created “as a safeguard against
abuse of state power in the exercise of criminal law enforcement; [it was]
meant to ensure that no one would be held accountable for a crime if the
person was mentally unaware of what had happened.”151 As such, strict liability crimes are rare.152
140. Robert Henderson, Criminal Law, Alaska Edition: The Purposes of Punishment, U.
ALASKA, https://ua.pressbooks.pub/criminallawalaskaed/chapter/1-5-the-purposes-of-punishment/
(last visited May 6, 2022).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Hallevy, supra note 16, at 177.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea, LAWSHELF, https://lawshelf.com/coursewarecontentview/model-penal-codes-mens-rea (last visited May 7, 2022).
149. Strict Liability, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_liability#:~:text=In%20both%20tort%20and%20criminal,examples%20of%20strict%20liability%20offenses (last visited May 6, 2022).
150. Lima, supra note 3, at 692.
151. Id. at 686.
152. Monica Steiner, What Are Some Common “Strict Liability” Crimes?, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-common-strict-liability-crimes.html (last visited
May 6, 2022).
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Determining who to punish in an artificially intelligent trolley problem,
using the four purposes of punishment and requiring mens rea, demonstrates
why the United States’ traditional criminal law framework does not fit well
with AI. For example, imagine an AI-powered self-driving car is driving one
passenger153 at night across a bridge suspended 1000 feet over water, when
five pedestrians try to cross the bridge directly in front of the car. Although
it might be a small percentage chance,154 the AI does not sense the five pedestrians early enough to be able to use the breaks to stop the car before a
crash occurs. The AI does, however, sense the five pedestrians in time to be
able to decide whether to keep driving forward or swerve out of the way. If
the car continues forward, it will inevitably kill the five pedestrians; if the
car swerves out of the way, it will inevitably kill the passenger. The AI did
not malfunction; rather, an unfortunate and unlikely sequence of actions
caused the AI to not be able to sense the pedestrians in time.
Now, instead of a traditional trolley problem, where a human has the
ability to choose, the AI powering the self-driving car must decide whether
to continue driving the car forward, killing the five pedestrians, or swerve
the car out of the way and off the bridge, killing the one passenger. For simplicity, and because this Note cannot address every single variation that
could happen, this Note assumes that the AI-powered self-driving car decides to run over the five pedestrians.
There are three agents or groups of agents that could likely be liable in
this situation: the self-driving car’s owner, the people who programmed the
AI that powers the self-driving car, and the self-driving car’s creator. Punishing any of these three agents or groups of agents using traditional criminal
law framework, however, does not seem to work.
Regarding the car’s owner, there is not a sufficient mens rea to hold this
agent criminally liable. The car’s owner may have external action that could
be stretched as an actus reus for criminal liability. For example, the owner,
in a sense, ceded control to the AI, tacitly trusting the AI’s decision-making.
This agent, however, did not choose what to do in the situation above nor
was involved in creating the AI. Ascribing this person a requisite mens rea
for the act of running over the pedestrians, therefore, is impractical.

153. One can imagine a world in the not-so-distant future where people own cars that drive
them around while they sit in the back seat working, or where people order self-driving taxis that
take them back home after a night out drinking. See Forbes Tech. Council, supra note 110; Dan
Reilly, Motional’s Driverless Taxi Fleet Will Expand Worldwide After Vegas 2023 Launch, CEO
Says, FORTUNE (Nov. 10, 2021, 5:41 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/11/10/motionals-driverlesstaxi-fleet-will-expand-worldwide-after-vegas-2023-launch-ceo-says/.
154. Society cannot assume that self-driving cars will be perfect, as it “would be foolish to
assume that self-driving cars are error-proof . . . A self-driving car may be unable to react appropriately to an unforeseen crisis, or its complicated technology may simply fail and cause an accident
involving damage, injuries, or even the loss of human life.” Gless et al., supra note 23, at 413.
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Punishing the self-driving car’s owner, however, does somewhat satisfy the
purposes of punishment. Although this agent was not involved in the decision to run over the pedestrians, punishing this person may satisfy retribution
by vindicating society, since this agent entrusted the AI with decision-making that the owner might have otherwise done itself. Regarding the other
purposes of punishment, punishing the owner may deter the agent and society as a whole from buying self-driving cars, but to the negative detriment
of preventing the industry from growing; rehabilitating this agent does not
seem effective as the agent did not act criminally outside of owning the car;
and incapacitating this person in jail seems excessive, given the person’s involvement was simply owning the car.
Likewise, regarding the people who programed the AI, there are neither
sufficient mentes reae to hold these agents liable, nor does punishing this
group of agents satisfy the purposes of criminal punishment. In a sense, if
only one individual programmed and trained the AI, that person’s act could
be stretched to the AI’s decision to run over the five pedestrians. It is unlikely
that this person should be attributed with a purposeful or knowing mens rea,
however, as it would seem unjust to hold that this person could have intended
or known how the AI would act, given that AI can act in unpredictable ways
in novel situations. Moreover, attributing this person with a purposeful or
knowing mens rea could lead to murder charges, a remarkably severe punishment for an action that this person could not control. If this situation occurred because of an issue or malfunction in the AI’s code, the programmer
could be attributed with a reckless or negligent mens rea. But in this situation, it was not a malfunction—just an unfortunate sequence of actions and
a decision made by the AI that the programmer might not have been able to
foresee. Moreover, the fact that self-driving cars will likely not be programmed by just one person but rather will require teams of people who in
turn are managed by many people155 magnifies criminal law’s inability to
hold these people criminally liable. If that is the case, then each time a situation like the one described above occurs, it could implicate hundreds of
people, making the process of attributing each person an actus reus and mens
rea impractical.
The purposes of punishment also do not fit well with this group of actors. Given that it was the AI’s decision to prioritize the passenger’s life over
the pedestrians, punishing these people will not satisfy retribution by

155. For example, Elon Musk explained that there are about 300 engineers working on Tesla’s
self-driving car software “Autopilot,” including “just under 200 on the software side and a little
over 100 on the chip design side.” Zachary Shahan, Tesla Autopilot Innovation Comes From Team
Of ~300 Jedi Engineers — Interview With Elon Musk, CLEANTECHNICA (Aug. 15, 2020),
https://cleantechnica.com/2020/08/15/tesla-autopilot-innovation-comes-from-team-of-300-jediengineers-interview-with-elon-musk/ (internal quotation omitted).
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vindicating society; it might deter these specific individuals and the public
from programming AI this way again, but only to the detriment that no one
would want to create self-driving cars in the future; it will not reform the
agents’ behavior; and these agents probably are not deserving of being incapacitated. Ultimately, it does not seem to satisfy the purposes of punishment
to hold possibly hundreds of people guilty of homicide or vehicular manslaughter.
Finally, attributing some form of mens rea to the self-driving car’s creator does not seem to work. Similar to the agents who programmed and
trained the AI, the creator’s decision to make a self-driving car could be
stretched to satisfy the actus reus requirement. The creator would not have
been reckless or negligent though—this was not an accident, but rather the
creator intentionally made the AI this way. Ascribing a purposeful or knowing mens rea to the creator, however, seems inappropriate, extreme, and
would deter future self-driving car production. Like the AI’s programmers,
it is likely that the car’s creator could not have predicted the way that the AI
acted, thereby making a purpose or knowing mens rea inappropriate. Furthermore, a purpose or knowing mens rea could lead to an extreme punishment that does not seem fitting. No car company would want to produce selfdriving cars if it could be found guilty of murder for creating an AI-powered
self-driving car.
The purposes of punishment, however, do appear to somewhat fit with
the self-driving car’s creator. Punishing the company that built the car and
hired people to program the AI could satisfy retribution, as victims and society would feel some form of satisfaction that the criminal system is working. Deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation might still not be satisfied,
though, as the company that built the car and society as a whole would be
negatively deterred from producing self-driving cars, there is no real criminal
behavior in this specific situation that the company could rehabilitate, and
incapacitation does not translate well to a company.
As such, in an artificially intelligent trolley problem, using the United
States’ traditional criminal law framework to punish the AI and self-driving
car’s owner, programmers, and creator does not seem to work. Although it
might be possible to stretch an actus reus for these agents, attempting to ascribe the proper mens rea to the agents is impractical. At the core of this issue
is the fact that AI can act in unpredictable ways in novel situations, and here,
this artificially intelligent trolley problem illuminates one example of when
this could occur.156 Although traditional criminal law does not fit well with
156. Moreover, this is a very specific example of an artificially intelligent trolley problem.
From a legal standpoint, there are many other pressing issues that will need to be resolved. For
example, should the car company decide that AI will make the same decision each time based on
the data it takes in? Society might agree that creators should program AI to universally prioritize
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AI, it does seem like punishing the AI’s owner and creator would vindicate
society for the AI’s harms. As discussed in Section IV(A)–(B), holding these
agents strictly liable for their AI’s actions, but creating standards that can
provide the agents immunity from punishment, will solve the issues that this
artificially intelligent trolley problem poses. Moreover, it will help balance
the competing interests of not wanting to deter AI’s development with satisfactorily punishing an actor when harm occurs.
C. AI’s General Incompatibility with Traditional Criminal Law
Framework

Although the particular artificially intelligent trolley problem described
above is narrow, it helps illuminate AI’s general incompatibility with the
United States’ traditional criminal law framework. Specifically, human actors ceding decision making control to AI—a sometimes unpredictable decision maker—strains our ability to define these human actors’ mens rea and
satisfactorily punish the correct actor.
The central problem for criminal law will be deciding what agent to
punish when AI is involved in a crime and the technology makes decisions
that humans could not predict. The artificially intelligent trolley problem
demonstrates that humans ceding decision making to AI will impact both
crimes that include a mens rea element and various aspects of people’s lives.
For example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act157 criminalizes fraud and
various actions related to computers and includes explicit mens rea like
“knowingly access[ing] a computer,”158 “intentionally access[ing] a computer,”159 and “knowingly and with intent to defraud.”160 Issues could arise
with enforcing this statute if an AI uses its own unpredictable decision making—without human approval—to access a computer without authorization.
Kissinger, Schmidt, and Huttenlocher question whether humans will
“be able to detect unwelcome (AI) choices or reverse unwelcome choices in
time . . . If we are unable to fathom the logic of each individual decision,
should we implement its recommendations on faith alone? If we do not, do

passengers’ lives over pedestrians or, alternatively, to enact a utilitarian view of protecting more
lives over fewer. Will people buy self-driving cars if the AI does not prioritize a passenger’s life
over a pedestrian’s life? What if the person inside the car is a 60-year-old felon and the five people
crossing the street are children, and the AI decides that children’s lives are worth more than a
felon’s life, thereby killing the felon? Questions like these will themselves spring moral, philosophical, and legal issues that will need to be addressed.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2020).
158. Id. § 1030(a)(1).
159. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
160. Id. § 1030(a)(4).
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we risk interrupting performance superior to our own?”
ger, Schmidt, and Huttenlocher posit:
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Moreover, Kissin-

Whether an individual playing AI-assisted chess might be counseled
to sacrifice a valuable piece that sophisticated players had traditionally
deemed indispensable is of little consequence, but in the context of
national security, what if AI recommended that a commander in chief
sacrifice a significant number of citizens or their interests in order to
save, according to the AI’s calculation and valuation, an even greater
number?162

AI will inevitably make decisions that humans did not want nor could
predict. Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig poignantly explained in 1981 that “one cannot give robots the Promethean fire-gift of intelligence and still hope to keep
them shackled.”163
Ultimately, it appears that AI is incompatible with the United States’
traditional criminal law framework. The artificially intelligent trolley problem illuminates this issue, demonstrating that when the AI decides to run
over five pedestrians and save the one passenger’s life, it is both hard to ascribe mens rea to the agents involved in the incident and satisfy all the purposes of punishment. It is not just self-driving cars that will pose this issue
though—AI will also be incompatible with other crimes that include a mens
rea element. The central issue is that when humans cede decision making
control to AI, it makes assigning mens rea to agents involved in criminal
behavior impractical.

IV. Proposed Reforms
It is apparent that AI does not fit well with the United States’ traditional
criminal law framework. Our criminal laws emphasize mens rea’s importance in holding agents criminally labile, and humans ceding decision
making control to AI—such as with self-driving cars—both strains our ability to determine certain agents’ mens rea and satisfy the purposes of punishment. Because it is clear that AI will only continue to grow in society, the
United States must find a way to resolve this issue that balances the need to
satisfactorily punish the right agent(s) with society’s desire to continue developing AI.
This Section proposes two modifications to the United States’ traditional criminal law system that can solve the issues described above: (1) hold
AI’s creators, owners, and users strictly liable for their AI’s actions; and (2)
161. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 23.
162. Id.
163. Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig, Frankenstein Unbound: Towards a Legal Definition of Artificial
Intelligence, 13 FUTURES 442, 445 (1981).
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create standards that, if followed, can give these creators, owners, and users
immunity from strict liability. Additionally, as AI is a continuously evolving
technology, this Section suggests that the United States creates a task force
or agency to research AI and make recommendations as new developments
appear.
A. Hold AI’s Creators, Owners, and Users Strictly Liable

American criminal law should hold AI’s creators, owners, and users
strictly liable for their AI’s actions. As stated in Section III(B)(2), strict liability entails holding an agent criminally liable without having to prove a
requist mens rea element.164 Strict liability, however, “stands in stark tension
with many of [criminal law’s] underlying principles.”165 Currently, “criminal
law is skeptical of strict liability—American society reserves strict liability
for particularly sensitive contexts (e.g., sex with a minor) or lesser infractions
with low stakes (e.g., traffic infractions).”166
1. Strict Liability’s Criminal Law History

AI is not the first technology that has posed a problem for criminal law.
Case law suggests that strict liability—although rare in criminal law—is the
best option to address the issues that AI poses on criminal law and balance
the competing interests. In Morissette v. United States,167 the petitioner was
accused of taking bomb shell casings from the Air Force, and the district
court and court of appeals found him guilty of violating a law “which provides that ‘whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts’ government property is punishable by fine and imprisonment.”168 One issue that
the United States Supreme Court addressed on appeal was whether criminal
law statutes necessarily require a mens rea element.169 The Court found that
certain criminal laws do not require a mens rea element, and it defined a set
of examples that it called “public welfare offenses . . . [that] do not fit neatly
into any of such accepted classifications of common-law offenses” and do
“not specify intent as a necessary element.”170 The Court explained that:
[w]hile such offenses do not threaten the security of the state in the
manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Strict Liability, supra note 149.
Lima, supra note 3, at 692.
Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. REV. 513, 554 (2015).
342 U.S. 246 (1952).
Id. at 247–250.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 255–56.
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essential to the social order as presently constituted. In this respect,
whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity . . . The accused, if
he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with
no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities.171

The Court provided a few examples of crimes that it considered public
welfare offenses and that include “no mental element but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions.”172 These include crimes in heavily regulated industries, health and safety violations, where there are too many cases, traffic
violations, where punishments are low, and where there is minimal stigma.173
Of particular importance to AI, the Court, while describing crimes in
heavily regulated industries, noted that “[t]he industrial revolution multiplied
the number of workmen exposed to injury from increasingly powerful and
complex mechanisms, driven by freshly discovered sources of energy, requiring higher precautions by employers.”174 Regarding traffic violations,
the Court explained how “[t]raffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of came to subject the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners
and drivers were not to observe new cares and uniformities of conduct.”175
Because of the “peculiar nature and quality of” these offenses:
penalties serve as effective means of regulation, and . . . such legislation dispense with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger
good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise
innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.176

In State v. Baker,177 the Court of Appeals of Kansas applied the Supreme Court’s strict liability framework when reviewing a case where the
defendant appealed his speeding conviction.178 In Baker, the defendant
claimed that he could not be guilty because he did not have a criminal intent,
as his cruise control malfunctioned, and, therefore, that malfunction caused

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 256.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 253–63.
Id. at 253–54.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 259–60 (internal quotation omitted).
571 P.2d 65 (1977).
Id. at 66–68.
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his car to accelerate past the speed limit.
and, citing Morissette, explained that:

Vol. 14:1

The court rejected this argument

the evidence proffered suggests a malfunction of a device attached to
the motor vehicle operated by the defendant over which he had or
should have had absolute control. Defendant does not suggest that the
operation of the motor vehicle on the day of his arrest was anything
but a voluntary act on his part, nor that anyone other than himself activated the cruise control, which may have caused his excessive speeding. Nor does he suggest that any occurrence of circumstance existed
which required of him more care than society might reasonably expect.180

In affirming the lower court’s decision, the court stated that the “defendant assumed the full operation of his motor vehicle and when he did so
and activated the cruise control attached to that automobile, he clearly was
the agent in causing the act of speeding.”181 As such, the court held that “[t]he
safety and welfare of the public” dictates that the defendant be held liable for
this crime, because “such obligations may not be avoided by delegating a
task which he normally would perform to a mechanical device such as cruise
control.”182
2. Strict Liability’s Application to AI

Taken together, Morissette and Baker provide a framework for why
American criminal laws should hold AI’s creators, owners, and users strictly
liable for their AI’s actions. It is clear that as “individuals and institutions
increasingly leverage robotics with emergent properties, society could witness a barrage of activity that would be illegal were it carried out or even
sanctioned by people.”183 As demonstrated in Section III(B)(1)–(2), selfdriving cars are an increasingly relevant application of AI that could perform
illegal actions. Moreover, as explained in Section III(B)(3), it is not just selfdriving cars that will pose issues—generally, AI will strain criminal law’s
ability to determine the mens rea of agents involved in crimes.
AI falls squarely into American case law’s application of strict liability
to public welfare offenses. Just as Morissette noted how the industrial revolution heralded in new, powerful, and complex instruments that required

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Calo, supra note 166.
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higher precaution, so too has the Fourth Industrial Revolution introduced AI—a new, powerful, and complex technology that requires extreme
precaution. Moreover, similar to how the Court explained that traffic violations’ volume and variety subjected pedestrians to unfair risks,186 AI also
poses the danger of vast and novel actions that subject bystanders to unfair
risks.187 Finally, like Baker described how people who drive a car and activate cruise control become those technologies’ agents,188 AI’s creators, owners, and users become the technology’s agents and are responsible for their
AI’s actions.189 AI’s creators, owners, and users cannot avoid the criminal
consequences of their AI’s actions merely because they delegated tasks to
their AI that might normally be done by humans or non-AI technology.190
Strict liability also strikes the right balance between the competing interests at issue: the desire to continue developing AI and also the need to
appeal to victims that have been wronged in sometimes unpredictable ways.
Because AI can act in novel ways,191 it is likely that “we lack even the sense
that a wrong, or even a mistake, was committed in the first instance. No one
expected, much less intended, the technology to do what it did.”192 Still, “we
have a victim who suffered real harm.”193 Holding AI’s creators, owners, and
users strictly liable would help satisfy potential victims and the purposes of
punishment. Punishing these agents serves as retribution for the victims;
helps deter both the criminal agent and society as a whole from acting in
potentially criminal ways; and can help rehabilitate the criminal agents by
forcing them to improve their AI.
The issue with holding AI’s creators, owners, and users strictly liable is
that it might detrimentally deter future AI development. As Morissette noted,
strict liability sometimes “puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person
otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”194

184. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253–54.
185. The Fourth Industrial Revolution “is blurring the lines between the physical, digital and
biological spheres . . . Simply put, the Fourth Industrial Revolution refers to how technologies like
artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles and the internet of things are merging with humans’
physical lives.” Elizabeth Schulze, Everything You Need to Know About the Fourth Industrial Revolution, CNBC (Jan. 17, 2019, 11:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/16/fourth-industrialrevolution-explained-davos-2019.html.
186. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254.
187. See, e.g., the artificially intelligent trolley problem supra Section III(B)(2).
188. Baker, 571 P.2d at 69.
189. Lima, supra note 3, at 681.
190. See Baker, 571 P.2d at 69.
191. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1.
192. Calo, supra note 166.
193. Id.
194. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 259–60 (internal quotation omitted).
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Holding AI’s creators, owners, and users strictly liable for their AI’s actions
that they sometimes cannot predict might prevent people from wanting to
develop AI because of the likelihood of criminal punishment. As discussed
in Section IV(B) below, to balance this interest, the United States must create
standards that can give these creators, owners, and users immunity from
strict liability.
The United States will need to determine what the criminal penalty will
be for creators, owners, and users that are held strictly liable for their AI’s
actions. Morissette explained that because of public welfare offenses’ “peculiar nature and quality[,]” the penalties should “serve as effective means
of regulation.”195 The Court, however, also clarified that these “penalties
commonly are relatively small.”196 As such, the criminal punishment for
holding these people strictly liability should not be akin to murder; rather,
the punishment should be closer to misdemeanor manslaughter, a form of
involuntary manslaughter, where defendants “are typically punish[ed] by a
fine or less than one year in prison.”197 This type of misdemeanor will accomplish Morissette’s goal of using these criminal penalties as a form of
regulation, by punishing defendants “for putting into play a technology physically capable of causing a specific harm where that harm is actually realized
. . . [thereby] vindicating an injury in the eyes of society and providing a
moral and pragmatic check on overuse of a potentially dangerous technology
without justification.”198 The punishment will also not be too large as to unjustifiably punish agents that lack any mens rea.
Determining the appropriate punishment could be an issue for the task
force or agency that the United States must create, discussed in Section
IV(C), which will continually research AI and make recommendations based
on the technology’s development.
B. Create Standards That Can Give AI’s Creators, Owners, and Users
Immunity from Strict Liability

The United States must also protect AI’s development by creating
standards that can give AI’s creators, owners, and users immunity from strict
liability for their AI’s actions. Although it is important for society to hold
195. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
196. Id. at 256.
197. Involuntary Manslaughter, JUSTIA (Oct. 2021), https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/homicide/involuntary-manslaughter/. Some states, however, punish involuntary manslaughter harsher than a maximum one-year prison sentence. Sydney Goldstein, Involuntary Manslaughter:
Penalties
and
Sentencing,
LAWINFO
(June
24,
2021),
https://www.lawinfo.com/resources/criminal-defense/involuntary-manslaughter/involuntary-manslaughter-penalties-sentencing.html. For example, California treats involuntary manslaughter as a
felony, “punishable from two to four years in a state prison.” Id.
198. Calo, supra note 166.
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some agent responsible when a crime occurs, “[t]he challenge remains to
strike a fair balance between society’s interest in promoting innovation and
the dangers associated with the use of Intelligent Agents with destructive
potential.”199 To strike this balance, “we might choose to limit criminal liability of operators by reducing their duty of care, in particular with regard to
the rule that one must not expose others to risks that one cannot control.”200
These standards “may be drawn up by individual providers of AI systems or
by organisations representing them or by both, including with the involvement of users and any interested stakeholders and their representative organisations.”201
For example, the United States could create standards for AI’s creators
and operators where:
[e]ven . . . [if] it is foreseeable that robots may commit fatal mistakes
resulting from misguided self-learning, the duty of operators of (at
least some) robots could be reduced by employing the best knowledge
and technology available in manufacturing, programming, testing, and
monitoring them. Producers of robots must test them extensively and
must closely observe, in particular, their autonomous learning processes. They must, moreover, monitor feedback from customers and
must react immediately to reports of harmful conduct.202

Moreover, “societies could permit an AI to be employed only after its
creators demonstrate its reliability through testing processes.”203 Under a
standard like this, if:
for example, a newly introduced self-driving car for unknown reasons
has isolated incidents of malfunctioning, the producer will have to examine possible causes. If these incidents cannot be explained by improper handling or interference of third parties, and if the problem cannot be resolved by reprogramming the car, the producer will have to
take the car off the market. If the producer fails to do so and the car
causes harm to persons, he will be liable for negligent or even intentional bodily injury or homicide.204

199. Gless et al., supra note 23, at 436.
200. Id. at 434.
201. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down
Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, EUROPEAN COMMISSION at Title IX, Article 69, ¶ 3, COM (2021) 206 final
(Apr. 21, 2021) [hereinafter Artificial Intelligence Act].
202. Gless et al., supra note 23, at 434.
203. KISSINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 82.
204. Gless et al., supra note 23, at 434.
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Regarding AI’s owners and users, “[g]iven the nature of AI systems and
the risks to safety and fundamental rights possibly associated with their use,
including as regard the need to ensure proper monitoring of the performance
of an AI system in a real-life setting, it is appropriate to set specific responsibilities for users.”205 This could include “a general obligation” that AI’s
owners “train users of AI systems.”206 For example, owners could be “required to provide training in autonomous vehicles as part of the process of
obtaining a driving license.”207 Users should also only use “AI systems in
accordance with the instructions of use and certain other obligations” that
the AI’s owners and creators provide.208 If users “have reasons to consider
that the use in accordance with the instructions of use may result in the AI
system presenting a risk . . . they shall inform the provider or distributor and
suspend the use of the system.”209 If owners and users comply with these
standards, they would be immune from strict liability.
Finally, the United States should create standards for creators, owners,
and users that take into consideration their AI’s “potential for harm.”210 For
example, the “standards of care should be stricter with respect to robots that
are of lesser social value, such as toys. With respect to self-driving cars, on
the other hand, the risk remaining after careful testing and monitoring may
be offset against the general benefits of using such cars.”211
To balance the need to satisfactorily punish with the importance of developing AI, if AI’s creators, owners, and users “comply with these strict
standards [they] could be deemed to have fulfilled their duty of care, even
though they (along with everyone else) know that certain risks remain.”212
Therefore, even though the AI might have “deviate[d] from what was expected, the harm caused by such . . . aberrations would be attributed to ‘society,’ which agrees to accept certain residual risks necessarily associated
with the employment of Intelligent Agents.”213 As such, AI would be a “socially accepted risk.”214

205. Artificial Intelligence Act, supra note 201, at Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council, § 58.
206. European Committee on Crime Problems: Feasibility Study on a Future Council of Europe
Instrument on Artificial Intelligence and Criminal Law, CDPC 2020 3 Rev. at 14.
207. Id.
208. Artificial Intelligence Act, supra note 201, at Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council, § 58.
209. Id. at Title III, Article 29, ¶ 4.
210. Gless et al., supra note 23, at 436.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 434.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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C. Create a Task Force or Agency to Research AI and Make
Recommendations

The United States should establish a task force or agency that is responsible for continually researching AI and making recommendations based on
its findings. This group would be “a more unified agency for robotics, something like a Federal Robotics Commission (FRC) to deal with the novel human experiences robotics occasions.”215 Because it would be inefficient for
the relevant lawmakers and agencies to become experts in AI’s “complexities,” this proposed group:
could routinely assist officials, states, and other agencies—from the
Department of Justice to the U.S. Copyright Office—to grapple with
the essential qualities of robotics. The agency could build its own expertise around the effects of social technology on human behavior and
help develop standards for the industry and guidance for prosecutors
and courts.216

The United States has a history of forming similar task forces and agencies. Generally, “[t]echnology has repeatedly played a meaningful part in the
formation of new agencies.”217 For example, “[t]he need to manage the impact of radio on society in turn led to the formation in 1926 of the Federal
Radio Commission. The Radio Commission itself morphed into the Federal
Communications Commission . . . and is today charged with a variety of
tasks related to communications devices and networks.”218 Similarly, “[t]he
advent of the train required massive changes to national infrastructure, as it
physically connected disparate communities and consistently sparked, sometimes literally, harm to people and property. We formed the Federal Railroad
Administration in response. This agency now lives within the U.S. Department of Transportation.”219 Moreover, “[t]he introduction of the vaccine and
the attendant need to organize massive outreach to Americans helped turn a
modest U.S. Marine Hospital Service into the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and sowed the seeds for the Department of
Health and Human Services.”220 Furthermore, “there would be no Federal
Aviation Administration without the experiences and challenges of human
flight.”221
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The unique challenges that AI poses on society warrants a task force or
agency to monitor the technology. It is apparent that “[n]ew agencies . . .
arise to address new or newly acute challenges posed by big events or
changes in behavior.”222 The United States previously created the now discontinued National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence in 2018
“to consider the methods and means necessary to advance the development
of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies to
comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the
United States.”223 It is time that the United States creates a task force or
agency to research AI’s domestic impact on society.

V. Conclusion
AI is now present everywhere in society. Although less than 75 years
ago researchers were left pondering whether machines can think, today AIpowered technology that replicates human thinking is revolutionizing the
world—detecting lung cancer better than doctors, defeating chess masters,
and creating new antibiotics. AI does this by being capable of making unique
and sometimes unpredictable decisions in novel situations.
AI’s ability to act on its own, however, raises issues for the United
States’ traditional criminal law system. Traditional criminal law emphasizes
the importance of mens rea—people’s mental state as they act. What mens
rea a person had when acting is a factor in determining that person’s criminal
punishment. The artificially intelligent trolley problem—where an AI powered self-driving car must decide whether to prioritize pedestrians or passengers’ lives—illustrates that when AI is involved in a crime, the process of
ascribing mens rea to the actors involved in the crime becomes impractical
and satisfying the purposes of punishment becomes difficult. Although this
example uses self-driving cars, AI will pose an issue for most crimes that
include a mens rea element.
Though AI does not fit with the United States’ traditional criminal law
system, there are solutions to solve this issue. The United States must hold
AI’s creators, owners, and users strictly liable for their AI’s actions and create standards that, if followed, can give these creators, owners, and users
immunity from strict liability. The United States should also create a task
force or agency empowered to research AI and make recommendations as
new developments occur.

222. Id. at 556.
223. About, NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON A.I., nscai.gov/about/ (last visited May 7, 2022) (internal
quotation omitted).

